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Abstract Glynn et al. (2017, https://doi.org/10.1002/2016EF000487) note the importance of engaging
stakeholders in the process of public policymaking and analysis. In particular, they highlight the central
role biases, beliefs, heuristics, and values play in such engagement. However, the framework they propose
neglects uncertainty, which signiﬁcantly restricts any ability to engage effectively with BBHV. We show how
their paper’s narrow view can be widened to include aspects of risk and uncertainty.
1. Introduction
Glynn et al. (2017) note the importance of engaging stakeholders in the process of public policymaking and
analysis. In particular, they highlight the central role biases, beliefs, heuristics, and values (BBVH) play in such
engagement. However, the framework proposed by Glynn et al. neglects uncertainty, which signiﬁcantly
restricts any ability to engage effectively with BBHV.
Appropriate consideration of uncertainty goes far beyond replacing point forecasts with best-estimate
joint probability distributions over future states of the world. Rather, uncertainty is fundamental to how
both producers and users of scientiﬁc information understand and use that information. In his The
Idea of Justice, Sen (2009) argues that fundamental attributes of our world include a diversity of beliefs
and values as well as irreducible uncertainty about the consequences of our actions. These two attributes
intertwine in any attempt to provide salient, credible, and legitimate decision support for complex pro-
blems such as climate change and sustainability. In evaluating the credibility of forecasts, stakeholders
seek congruence between the perceived nature of the uncertainty and its representation (Du et al.,
2011; Wallsten & Budescu, 1995). Stakeholders are likely to view with suspicion overly precise forecasts
for complex future Earth systems. The concept of “social construction of risk” emphasizes the extent to
which judgments about uncertainty are intertwined with BBVH (Mary Douglas). “Cultural cognition” high-
lights the extent to which scientiﬁc information is shifted through values-based ﬁlters and trusted social
networks (Dan Kahan). The concept of “wicked problems’ emphasizes the challenges that arise when
uncertainty intersects with differing, values-driven problem framings. The literatures on scenarios, itera-
tive risk management, and risk governance (see for instance, Box 1-3 in the 2012 IPCC Special Report
on Extreme Events (IPCC, 2012)) all aim to provide frameworks for engaging stakeholders under such
conditions. Neglecting the central role of uncertainty will hobble any attempt to improve the quality
of decisionmaking when “facing new, complex issues of situations especially if they need to be managed
for the beneﬁt of a wider community, for the longer-term and the larger-scale.” (Glynn et al., p. 1; quote
from abstract).
This response to Glynn et al. suggests how that paper’s proposed framework could begin to address the fun-
damental concept of uncertainty. This response begins by deﬁning a generic framework for dealing with
uncertainty. This framework is next used to specify shortcomings in Glynn et al.’s treatment of uncertainty
and how it can be dealt with in making policy decisions. The paper ends with some notions from the ﬁeld
of uncertainty research that we hope will inspire researchers in the ﬁeld of BBHV.
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2. A Framework For Dealing With Uncertainty
Making plans for the future depends on anticipating changes, especially when making long-term plans or
planning for rare events. Consider, for example, decisions or concerns affected by the consequences of
climate change; the future demand for mobility; the planning of megaprojects, which energy sources
to rely on in the future; the role of information and communications technology in healthcare; or how
cities will develop. Or think of rare events like a natural disaster, a ﬁnancial crisis, or a terrorist attack. These
situations are all characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Ignoring uncertainty could lead to large
adverse consequences, and policymakers have an interest in limiting the possibility of such adverse
consequences happening.
In a broad sense, uncertainty may be deﬁned simply as missing knowledge, that is, the absence of informa-
tion. With respect to decisionmaking, uncertainty refers to the gap between available knowledge and the
knowledge decisionmakers would need in order to choose a policy that meets the objectives across a range
of plausible futures. This uncertainty clearly involves subjectivity, since it relates to satisfaction with existing
knowledge, which is colored by the underlying values and perspectives of those involved in the decisionmak-
ing process. But this in itself becomes a trap when implicit assumptions are left unexamined or unquestioned.
Uncertainty can be associated with all aspects of a problem of interest (e.g., the system comprising the deci-
sion domain, the world outside the system, the outcomes from the system, and the importance stakeholders
place on the various outcomes from the system).
In recent years, a great deal of attention in the public policymaking literature has been devoted to making
decisions in the face of uncertainty. Many tools and approaches have been developed to support decision-
making under uncertainty, which can be structured by considering the many dimensions of uncertainty.
Walker et al. (2003), as modiﬁed by Kwakkel et al. (2010), identiﬁed three dimensions of uncertainty. The ﬁrst
dimension is the location of uncertainty—where the uncertainty is located in the policy analysis framework
(in the external context, the system model, the system outcomes, or the weights on the outcomes). (For a
description of the policy analysis framework, see Walker, 2000.) The second dimension is the level of uncer-
tainty (they speciﬁed four levels, ranging from little to deep uncertainty). This is an expression of the degree
or severity of the uncertainty. The third dimension is the nature of the uncertainty. The phenomena about
which we are uncertain can either be due to our lack of knowledge about the phenomena (i.e., epistemic
uncertainty), the inherent variability in the phenomena (i.e., uncertainty inherent in their nature), or differ-
ences in framing by the participants in the decisionmaking process (which Brugnach et al., 2008, call ambi-
guity in their application of the uncertainty framework).
3. Criticism 1: Too Narrow Dealing With Uncertainty
Considering the “level” dimension of uncertainty, Walker et al. (2003) deﬁned four levels, based on the
amount of knowledge, there is about the future situation. Policy analysts have different approaches to design
policies for the different levels (see Table 1). The different levels of uncertainty can lead to very different types
of decisions/policies. The same policy problem can include elements of each level of uncertainty. It is there-
fore important to be transparent about the relationship between the level of uncertainty and the response
taken (i.e., the appropriate type of policy). By implicitly assuming that the future is knowable, Glynn et al.
are assuming that they have only to deal with Level 1 uncertainties.
Table 1
The Progressive Transition of Levels of Uncertainty From Complete Certainty to Total Ignorance
Level of
uncertainty Future situation Response
1 …is knowable (little uncertainty) “predict and act” policies and/or actions
2 …will behave in much the same way as the past (statistical uncertainty) “trend-based” policies and/or actions
3 …is well described by a few overarching scenarios (scenario uncertainty) “static robust” policies and/or actions
4 …is unknown or disagreed upon by experts and/or stakeholders, with no consensus on what
the future might bring (deep uncertainty)
adaptive policies and/or actions
Note. Source: Based on Walker et al. (2013), pp. 227–229.
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Figure 1 can be used to show how the Glynn et al. paper’s narrow framing (the shaded part in the ﬁgure) can
be widened to include dealing with all locations of uncertainty by distinguishing between uncertainty about
the outcomes of policy decisions and uncertainty about the valuation of the outcomes of policy decisions. The
paper’s approach to answering the question of what policy to choose is to focus on uncertainty about the
valuation of outcomes (the branch on the right side of the ﬁgure), and then to follow only the path involving
current values. The remainder of the “uncertainty tree” shown in the ﬁgure about the uncertainty of outcomes
and future values, although relevant for making decisions affecting the future world in the face of uncer-
tainty, is ignored.
Outcomes of policy decisions are those characteristics of the system that are considered relevant for the eva-
luation of policy measures. Uncertainty about outcomes can result from uncertainty about external inputs
and/or uncertainty about system responses to these external inputs. The paper assumes that the input and
system responses are known and that there is a system model that can be used as a predictive model. For
example, the authors claim that “predictions are essential,” and that these predictions need to be “traceable.”
Uncertainty about external inputs refers to inputs that are not controllable by the decisionmaker but may
inﬂuence the system signiﬁcantly, that is, exogenous inﬂuences. Even if there were certainty about the
external inputs to the system (that is, we knew how the external world would develop), there might still be
uncertainty about how the system would respond to those external inputs. The system response might
be uncertain because of model uncertainty and/or parametric uncertainty. Model uncertainty refers to the
missing knowledge about the system components, the relationships among them, and the values of the
parameters describing the relationships.
The second category of uncertainty refers to the valuation of outcomes—that is, the (relative) importance
given to the outcomes by crucial stakeholders. It involves uncertainty about how stakeholders value the
results of the changes in the system. One can distinguish uncertainty about current values related to different
perceptions, preferences, and choices the system’s stakeholders currently have regarding outcomes. This is
the focus of the paper’s “adaptive framework.” This raises two problems. First, it is difﬁcult to engage in an
adaptive learning process related to values without recognizing the strong connection between values
and perceptions of risk and uncertainty. Second, values may change over time in unpredictable ways, leading
to different valuations of future outcomes than those made by the current stakeholders. New stakeholders
might emerge and/or current stakeholders might leave the decision arena. These changes in stakeholders
and values can affect policy decisions today in substantial ways. This branch of future values in the “uncer-
tainty tree” is ignored by the paper.
4. Criticism 2: Too Little Treatment of Ambiguity
There are multiple stakeholders involved in almost all model-based decision support activities. These differ-
ent stakeholders have a heterogeneous background. This implies that different opinions, experiences,
Uncertainty regarding







































Figure 1. A typology of uncertainty (based on Walker et al., 2013, p.225).
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expectations, values, and forms of knowledge are present, which contributes to uncertainty in the weights (in
the location dimension) and uncertainty in the frames (in the nature dimension). Glynn et al., by focusing on
BBHV, restrict their attention to these two dimensions of uncertainty, completely ignoring the level dimen-
sion. By doing so, they implicitly assume that the future is knowable and that “optimal” solutions can be iden-
tiﬁed for policy problems (assuming that agreement can be reached among the stakeholders). In fact, in
several places in their paper, Glynn et al. explicitly refer to optimal solutions. However, one important insight
gained from uncertainty research is that choosing an “optimum” solution for a single most probable end
situation, or a limited set of plausible futures, is risky.
The third dimension of the Walker et al. typology of uncertainty is the “nature” dimension. In their original
paper specifying the typology (Walker et al., 2003), the authors identiﬁed two aspects of the nature dimen-
sion: epistemic uncertainty (uncertainty due to lack of knowledge about the phenomena) and ontological
or aleatory uncertainty (uncertainty due to variability). However, a companion paper (Kwakkel et al., 2010)
added ambiguity to the nature dimension. Ambiguity is deﬁned as uncertainty arising from the simultaneous
presence of multiple frames of reference about a certain phenomenon (Brugnach et al., 2008; Dewulf et al.,
2005). It relates to the fact that in complex decisionmaking problems there are generally multiple possible
and legitimate ways of interpreting the available information. There are multiple stakeholders involved in
almost all model-based decision support activities. These different stakeholders have a heterogeneous back-
ground. This implies that different opinions, experiences, expectations, values, and forms of knowledge are
present. In such situations, there is no obvious correct way of framing the decision problem at hand. This plur-
ality can give rise to a lack of clarity, misunderstandings, and value conﬂicts. Therefore, Kwakkel et al. (2010)
explicitly include ambiguity as an additional category of the nature dimension, in order to highlight the
importance of how the same data can be interpreted differently by different actors depending on differences
in frames and values. This is the heart of Glynn et al.’s discussion of BBHV. So with respect to the uncertainty
typology, their paper is focused on the “nature” dimension.
However, although focused on BBHV, their paper largely ignores the vast literature on this topic, including the
literature on “risk governance” (Renn, 2008) and the “social construction of risk” (Dake, 1992). Sociologists,
anthropologists, and other social scientists have addressed risk as a social or cultural concept (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982; Nelkin, 1989). This research suggests that concerns about risk may depend less on the
nature of the actual danger than on political, economic, or cultural biases. According to Renn (2008), risk
governance goes beyond traditional risk analysis to include the involvement and participation of various
stakeholders, as well as consideration of the broader legal, political, economic, and social contexts in which
a risk is evaluated and managed.
5. Conclusions
1. Glynn et al. observe “collectively, we humans do not have a natural, visceral, ability to consider, far into the
future, potential new states of the world and the needs of future generations and a global community.
This severely limits the abilities of communities to plan ahead and invest wisely, especially when potential
long term, large-scale, diffusely perceived beneﬁts, at the expense of acutely perceived, short-term, local,
or individual costs” (p. 2). For exactly this reason, several approaches for dealing with deep uncertainty
about future conditions have been developed.
2. Looking at the broad spectrum of uncertainties regarding the choice of a policy, the Glynn et al. paper
focuses only on the branch of the uncertainty typology of Figure 1 related to “current values” and assumes
that all other uncertainties belong to Levels 1 and 2 shown in Table 1. There is a large literature dealing
with the remaining elements of the uncertainty typology and the remaining levels of uncertainty. It is
critically important for these elements to be taken into account in making policy decisions using the
appropriate approach.
3. In several places in their paper, Glynn et al. refer to optimal solutions. One important insight gained from
uncertainty research is that optimizing solutions to a single most probable end situation, or to a limited
set of plausible futures, is a risky road. When dealing with deep uncertainty, “satisﬁcing” (doing reasonably
well across a broad range of possible futures, or “minimizing maximum regret”) is considered a better
approach than optimizing.
4. The other issue with optimality is that it inevitably requires prediction or assigning probabilities to aspects
of the future state of the world in circumstances that render these evaluations highly dubious. Beyond the
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substantive challenges to doing so reliably, this diverts attention from what is the true concern—
determining what short-term actions might prove conducive to achieving long-term goals across a
wide set of plausible futures.
5. The concept of BBHV may be useful in coming to grips with the challenge of dealing with deep uncer-
tainty in the valuation of outcomes in designing adaptive public policies, so long as the uncertainties
about the future are built into the analysis.
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